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International Investment Arbitration
and the European Debt Crisis
Ellie Norton*

Abstract
Argentina's 2001 default led to a unique development in the realm of sovereign debt
restrcturing During the length) process of negotiations, exchange offers, and haircuts, some of
the country's creditors began to allege violations of their bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
with Argentina and filed suit in the InternationalCentrefor the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID). Before this unprecedented action, it had been uncertain whether sovereign
debt could be considered an 'investment" covered by BITs at all. In August 2011, however,
the ICSID determined that it may be and that its tribunals havejurisdiction over these claims.
This decision has created a path to increased ICSID involvement in future sovereign debt
restructurings and has raised the question of the consequencesfor the current European debt
crisis. This Comment evaluates the ramifications of the introduction of internationalinvestment
arbitrationinto the realm of sovereign debt restructuring,particularly in light of the situationin
Europe. Despite some legitimate concerns, the Comment suggests that this development may
prove positive, increasing creditor protections and balancing negotiations, strengthening the
marketfor sovereign debt, andpotentially lessening the gravity of the crisis itself
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I. INTRODUCTION
The past ten years saw the advent of a novel development in the process of
sovereign debt restructuring. During Argentina's one-hundred-month
restructuring, the country's creditors began to bring unprecedented claims to the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
alleging that aspects of the restructuring violated the bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) between their home nations and Argentina. Until recently, however, it
was unclear whether sovereign debt actually qualified as an "investment" under
these treaties, and thus whether the ICSID had jurisdiction to hear the investors'
claims. But in August 2011, the ISCID held in the landmark case Abaclat v
Argentina' (Abacla) that sovereign debt does fall under the definition of
investment in at least some BITs.2 This decision will likely lead to increased
ICSID involvement in future sovereign debt restructuring.
This Comment evaluates the effects of the intersection of international
investment arbitration and sovereign debt restructuring, particularly in light of

I

Abaclat and Others v Argendine Repubc, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICSID Case No
ARB/07/5 (Aug 4, 2011) (Abacla).

2

Id at

356.
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the current European debt crisis and Greek restructuring. Section II examines
the relationship between sovereign debt restructuring and international
investment arbitration and lays out the key holdings of Abaclat. Section III
assesses the ramifications of this decision and argues that increased recourse to
investment arbitration during sovereign debt restructuring may prove to be a
beneficial development for both debtors and creditors. Section IV analyzes the
European debt crisis and predicts how Abaclat may influence its outcome.
This Comment ultimately suggests that increased ICSID involvement will
improve creditor protections, stabilize the market for sovereign debt, and allow
for more balanced and collective bargaining during restructuring. Given that
there is currently no alternative international mechanism to deal systematically
with creditor claims during sovereign debt crises, the ICSID may be the best
means by which to develop needed law in this arena. While there are concerns
regarding ICSID involvement, and several scholars have expressed anxiety over
its impact on the European debt crisis, 3 this Comment argues that there are ways
in which these drawbacks can be mitigated. A close examination of the situation
in Greece suggests that international investment arbitration may not play a major
role in its restructuring. Yet the potential for ICSID recourse may nonetheless
strengthen the sovereign debt market and lessen the chance of default for other
struggling European countries, ultimately decreasing the severity of the crisis.
II. SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
Governments have issued sovereign bonds as a primary means of raising
public funds for centuries.4 Current global public debt has been estimated at
over $35 trillions almost half of world economic output.6 But countries have
also continually found their debt loads unsustainable.7 Sovereign debt
restructurings occur when these countries change the terms of their repayments

3

4

See generally Kevin P. Gallagher, The New Vulture Culture: Sovereign Debt Restructuringand Trade and
Investment Treaties, Working Paper No 02/2011 (International Development Economics Associates
(IDEAs) 2011), online at http://www.networkideas.org/working/jul2011/02_2011.pdf (visited
Mar 29, 2012); Michael Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before InternationalCourts and Tribunals (Cambridge
2011); Kevin Gallagher, The Euroone Debt Crisis and the G20 (The Guardian Nov 1, 2011), online
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/nov/01/eurozone-debt-crisisg 2O (visited Mar 29, 2012).
See Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before InternationalCourts and Tribunals at 8 (cited in note 3).

6

See The Global Debt Clock (The Economist Apr 28, 2012), online at http://
www.economist.com/content/global-debt_clock (visited Apr 18, 2012).
The IMF measured world economic output at $69.66 trillion in 2011. International Monetary
Fund, World Economic Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain 190 (IMF April 2012), online at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/ (visited Apr 18, 2012).

7

See Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before InternationalCourts and Tribunals at 9 (cited in note 3).

5
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in order to manage the debt better over time or reduce its net present value.
There is currently no single method or forum by or in which sovereign debt can
be restructured.8 Rather, debtor countries generally provide their creditors with a
proposal, known as an exchange offer, to replace old bonds with new ones that
better reflect the country's current situation and ability to repay., These swaps
commonly include reductions in principal amounts, drops in interest rates, or
extended payment periods, often leading to significant bondholder losses.o
Argentina's 2001 default led to the longest and most complex sovereign
debt restructuring in history." It was also the first restructuring during which
creditors who chose not to participate in exchange offers pursued legal claims
through international investment arbitration, alleging violations of BITs between
their nations and Argentina.12 In total, approximately one billion dollars is at
stake in these arbitration proceedings at the ICSID.13
While these claims were novel at the time, it has become apparent that
there are several ways in which a country's debt restructuring could lead to
violations of its international arbitration agreements. In the cases brought under
the Italy-Argentina BIT, investors argue that Argentina's decision to bar any
reopening of the exchange process after its 2005 Exchange Offer constituted
expropriation, unfair and inequitable treatment, and national treatment
discrimination.14 The implementation of certain capital controls during
restructuring could also lead to claims of breaches of BIT transfer clauses.15

0

Louis Wells, Proper y Rights for Foregn Capital:Sovereign Debt and Private Direct Investment in Times of
Crisis, in Karl P. Sauvant, ed, Yearbook on International Investment Law, & Poliy 2009/2010 477,
477-81 (Oxford 2010).

9

See Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consentsin Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L Rev
59, 59 (2000).
For example, Argentina's 2005 Exchange Offer (discussed in greater detail below) was estimated

10

to have cost bondholders worldwide $73.6 billion in capital losses, past due interest payments,
and foregone investment returns. Robert J. Shapiro and Nam D. Pham, Agentina's 2001 Debt
Default and 2005 Debt Restructuring: An Update on the Costs to Bondholders, Taxpayers, and Investors *1
(American Task Force Argentina 2008), online at http://atfa.org/files/UpdatedShapiroArgentine Default andRestructuringCosts.pdf (visited Mar 29, 2012).
11
12

Waibel, Soveregn Defaults Before InternationalCourts and Tribunals at 15 (cited in note 3).
UNCTAD, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and InternationalInvestment Agreements *1 (1IA Issues Note No
2 2011), online at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaepcb2011d3_en.pdf (visited Mar 29,
2012).

13

Id at *3.

14

Id.

15

Id at *5.
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A. Potential BIT Violations During Restructuring
1. Expropriation.
BITs generally include a provision prohibiting the expropriation of
investors' property rights. Expropriation is typically defined as any state action
that deprives investors of the ownership, control, and/or economic benefit of
their investments.16 Both default and restructuring diminish the value of
investors' assets. Outright default renders bonds completely worthless. Similarly,
exchange offers, typically made on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, give investors the
choice of holding on to a worthless bond or accepting a new bond with a
significant haircut." If investors can show they were "substantially deprived" of
the economic benefit of their investment, international investment arbitration
may provide them compensatory relief pursuant to the expropriation provision.'"
2. National treatment.
Most BITs also include a "national treatment clause," which requires that
foreign investors from one state be treated the same as national investors and
foreign investors from other states." During both Russia's and Argentina's
restructurings, each government prioritized debt held by domestic investors,
often providing those bondholders earlier recovery on better terms.20 While the
debtor countries argued that this was absolutely necessary to keep their financial
systems from collapse, their preferential treatment of domestic creditors could
still be considered a violation of most BITs' national treatment clauses.
3. Fair and equitable treatment.
The standard BIT "fair and equitable treatment" clause reads: "Each
Contracting Party shall guarantee a fair and equitable treatment to investments

16

17

1s

19

20

A standard clause may read: "Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures depriving, directly
or indirectly, an investor of the other Contracting Party of an investment, unless [certain]
conditions are complied with." Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Chile
and the Government of the Hellenic Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
(1996), online at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/
Investments (Chile-Greece BIT)
othertreaties/details.jsp?treaty_id=783 (visited Mar 30, 2012).
Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora's Box: Sovereign Bonds in InternationalArbitration, 101 Am J Intl L
711, 737 (2007).
See Andrew Newcombe and Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of
Treatment 344 (Kluwer L Intl 2009).
The typical national treatment clause reads: "Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments
in its territory owned or controlled by investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment less
favorable than that which it accords to investments of its own investors or to investments of
investors of any third State." Chile-Greece BIT (cited in note 16) .
See Ugo Panizza, Is Domestic Debt the Answer to Debt Crises?, and Sergei Gorbunov, The -Russian
Federation, in Barry Herman, Jos6 Antonio Ocampo, and Shari Spiegel, eds, Overcoming Developing
Country Debt Crises (Oxford 2010).
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made by investors of the other Contracting Party in its territory and shall ensure
that the exercise of the rights thus recognized shall not be hindered in
practice."21 This has generally been interpreted to grant investors rights to
transparency, freedom from harassment and coercion, due process, good faith,
and protection of reasonable expectations.22
Michael Waibel has pointed out several ways in which investors could
claim that sovereign bond exchanges, especially when followed by laws
prohibiting further negotiations, constitute unfair and inequitable treatment. 23
First, bondholders could argue that bond exchanges lack transparency as to the
debtor country's payment capacity. 24 The basis of this claim would be that the
bondholders' legitimate expectations were impeded: They lent money on certain
terms and expected the debtor to be able to repay them on those terms. 2 5
Second, any bond exchanges that were clearly coercive26 would also violate fair
and equitable treatment. Even in the absence of explicit threats or
misrepresentations, if bondholders could show that defaulting governments did
not take their concerns into account before unilaterally issuing a take-it-or-leaveit offer, this could constitute a violation of due process. 27 Finally, the
restructuring process itself may be deemed to have been conducted in bad faith
if, as is typical of such restructurings, the government failed to participate in any
serious negotiations with investors before instituting a take-it-or-leave-it offer. In
order to succeed in a bad faith claim, however, bondholders would likely have to
prove that it was not merely the government's inability to pay that brought about
the restructuring, but its willful refusal to pay despite being capable of doing so.28
On the whole, it seems likely that fair and equitable treatment claims will
be brought frequently during sovereign debt restructuring. Yet it is less certain
whether they will be successful. This particular standard accords a great deal of
discretion to arbiters in weighing the interests of investors and debtor countries,
and decisions are likely to be highly fact-based and case-specific.29

22

Chile-Greece BIT (cited in note 16).
Waibel, 101 Am J Intl L at 748 (cited in note 17).

23

Id at 752-54.

24

Id at 752.

25

Past restructuring by a country would weaken this argument. Id.

26

27

See Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada,Award in Respect of Damages, 41 ILM 1347 TI 68-69 (NAFTA
2002) (defining coercive actions as actions that are burdensome and confrontational, involving
threats or misrepresentations).
See Waibel, 101 Am J Intl L at 752 (cited in note 17).

28

See id at 753.

29

See id at 753-54.

21
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4. Transfer.
Finally, most BITs provide for "the unrestricted transfer of the investment
and its return," to be "effected without delay."30 Not only would outright default
stop the transfer of a bond, but extended negotiations would also halt transfers
and could lead to threats of litigation. 3' Moreover, in El Paso Energy International
Company v Argentine Republic,32 the tribunal ruled that a tax on outflows
constituted an infringement of the transfer provision, entitling the investor to
compensation. This ruling suggests that certain capital controls commonly
employed during restructuring may also violate a BIT's transfer clause.3
There is a reason, however, that BIT claims have only recently begun to
arise in the context of sovereign debt restructuring. The idea that sovereign debt
represents an "investment" of the kind BITs are designed to protect is both
novel and contentious. Nonetheless, the ICSID recently held that sovereign
debt does in fact fall under a common definition of "investment" provided in
BITs.35 Regardless of its merits, this decision has opened the door to
unprecedented ICSID involvement in future sovereign debt restructurings. The
next sections will discuss both the details and ramifications of this development.
B. The Key Holdings of Abaclat
After defaulting on over $100 billion of debt in 2001, Argentina introduced
Exchange Offer 2005, allowing bondholders to trade in their bonds for new
ones with a lower principal or interest rate. 36 After the offer expired, Argentina
enacted an "Emergency Law" or "Cram Down Law," which barred the
government from reopening the exchange process or entering into any
settlement agreements with those who could have, but chose not to, participate
in the exchange.37 While more than 75 percent of bondholders participated, the
claimants in Abaclat did not. Initially, 180,000 claimants filed suit with the
ICSID, alleging expropriation, unfair and inequitable treatment, and national
treatment discrimination.38 In 2010, Argentina temporarily suspended parts of
the Emergency Law to open another exchange offer, but sixty thousand

30

Chile-Greece BIT at *5 (cited in note 16).

31

Gallagher, New TVulture Culture at 19-20 (cited in note 3).

32

Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/03/15 (Apr 27, 2006).

33

See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 349 (Oxford 2010).

34

See, for example, Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals at 212 (cited in
note 3); Abaclat, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 at l' 38-61 (Georges Abi-Saab dissenting).

3s

Abaclat, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 at

36

Id atT77.

37

Id atT78.
See id at 1 234; Alemanni, ICSID Case No ARB/07/8; Ali, ICSID Case No ARB/08/9.

38
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claimants still refused to participate or to withdraw from arbitration.39 On
August 4, 2011, the ICSID ruled that it had jurisdiction over these claims, and
that sovereign debt was an investment as defined by the Italy-Argentina BIT.40
The tribunal in Abaclat made three key rulings, each highly relevant to the
tribunal's future role in negotiating disputes arising out of sovereign debt
restructurings. First, the court concluded that sovereign debt falls under the
definition of "investment" provided in the Italy-Argentina BIT.41 Second, the
court allowed the aggregation of tens of thousands of individual claims into a
single "mass claim," despite lacking any precedent and admitting that this
consolidation would necessarily lead to decreased procedural rights for
individual claimants.42 Finally, the court ruled that when countries act unilaterally
as sovereigns to restructure debt in a way that may violate BIT provisions, this
gives rise to a treaty claim, which is independent of any contract claim.4 3
The definition of "investment" provided in Article 1(1)(c) of the ItalyArgentina BIT, as translated by the tribunal, includes "obligations, private or
public tide or any other right to performances of services having economic
value, including capitalized revenues."44 The majority reasoned that the word
"obligations," considered in the context of the rest of the clause, must include
bonds, as well as security entitlements in those bonds.45 It went on to hold that
sovereign debt also constitutes an investment under the ICSID Convention, as
its purpose is to "encourage private investment while giving the Parties the tools
to further define what kind of investment they want to promote."46 Here, the
tribunal found that bondholders made a contribution that led to the creation of
the kind of value that the language of the BIT made clear both parties meant to
protect. Thus, the tribunal concluded that under both the BIT and the ICSID
Convention, the claimants' sovereign debt constituted an investment.47
Argentina then argued that mass claims are incompatible with the
framework of the ICSID, as the tribunal is unable to find facts on and consider
39

Abaclat, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 at

40

Id at

41

Id at T 356.

42

Id at IT 490, 537.

43

Abaclat,ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 at

44

Id at ' 352.

4s

Id at 1361.

46

Id at

47

Abaclat,ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 at

f 331,

95-97.

356.

321-23.

1 364. The tribunal refused to apply the previously established Salini test, reasoning that it
would preclude ICSID jurisdiction over sovereign debt (a means-ends argument sharply criticized
by the dissent). Because the tribunal believed that both Italy and Argentina clearly meant for
sovereign bonds to be considered investments under their BIT, it found that it would be contrary
to the Convention's aim to exclude them from ICSID's jurisdiction. See Salini v Morocco, Decision
on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/00/04 (July 23, 2001).
366-67 (cited in note 1).
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each individual's circumstances. The majority countered, however, that if "the
tribunal has jurisdiction over the claims of several individual Claimants, it is
difficult to conceive why and how the Tribunal could lose jurisdiction where the
number of Claimants outgrows a certain threshold."48 It also deemed Argentina's
express consent to collective proceedings unnecessary, reasoning that even
though the ICSID Convention does not provide for mass claims, refusing to
allow them would be contrary to the Convention's spirit.49 The tribunal did
admit that as the case progresses the tribunal will likely be unable to consider
each claim individually, and that parties' procedural rights will necessarily be
limited.so But these concerns were outweighed by the fact that requiring each
claimant to file individually would be "practically impossible," and that the
claims in Abaclat are similar enough to allow decreased procedural rights.51 The
tribunal considers itself flexible enough to adjust to modified collective
proceedings.52 And its ruling suggests that the ICSID will be amenable to hearing
similar mass creditor claims in future sovereign debt restructurings.53
Argentina further contended that its actions merely constituted a breach of
the repayment provisions of its bond contracts, not a violation of its treaty
obligations under the Italy-Argentina BIT.54 The tribunal responded, however,
that whether Argentina breached its contractual obligations was irrelevant,55
because the state justified its failure to perform by its dire financial situation.56
Deeming itself insolvent, Argentina enacted a law unilaterally changing the terms
of its bonds. This action was an exercise of sovereign power alone-neither
based on nor derived from any contractual provision5 The tribunal therefore
found that while investors may have independent contract claims against
Argentina, claims based on the exercise of sovereign power must be considered
separate treaty claims alleging a breach of the Italy-Argentina BIT.68
This reasoning suggests that any sovereign action during restructuring may
give rise to a treaty claim, independent of any contract claim. If investors can
show that a defaulting country exercised sovereign power, they may bring suit in
48

Id at

49

Id at

5

Idat 531.

51

Abaclat, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 at $ 537.

52

Id at if 534-35.

s3

This may be key in evaluating the consequences of increased ICSID involvement in sovereign
debt restructurings, and will be discussed further in Sections III and IV.

54

Abaclat, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 at 307.

5s

Id at T318.

56

Id at

321.

s7

Id at

323.

58

Abaclat, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 at

490.

f 518-20.
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the ICSID regardless of existing contracts. This means not only that investors
can choose the most favorable forum in which to sue, but that contractual
provisions will be irrelevant for investors who choose to pursue a BIT rather
than a contract action. Thus, even if most creditors have agreed to accept certain
restructuring terms, holdouts, who otherwise would be contractually bound, can
seek potentially superior legal relief by bringing treaty actions to the ICSID.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ABACLAT
Despite strong arguments that the ICSID should not have interpreted
sovereign debt as an investment subject to its jurisdiction,59 it nonetheless seems
to have decided to enter the world of sovereign debt restructuring.60 What
remains to be seen is whether this will prove detrimental or beneficial. This
Comment suggests the latter: the availability of an opportunity to resolve debtorcreditor disputes effectivelycould improve creditor protections, stabilize the
market for sovereign debt, and allow for more balanced bargaining during
restructuring. Moreover, if accompanied by the establishment of a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) able to mitigate debtor financing and
holdout concerns, all parties could ultimately gain.
A. Benefits of ICSID Involvement in Sovereign Debt
Restructuring
There are currently significant gaps in creditor protection during sovereign
debt restructurings. Creditors have very few legal rights, especially when
compared to creditors in the average corporate bankruptcy proceeding.61 It is
generally difficult for creditors to affect almost any aspect of a restructuring

5

60

61

See, for example, Abaclat, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 (Georges Abi-Saab dissenting); Waibel,
Sovereign DefaultsBefore InternationalCourts and Tribunalsat 212-16 (cited in note 3).
Neither ICSID Convention nor individual BITs explicitly recognize that previous tribunal awards
must be considered binding precedent. See Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties at 155 (cited in
note 33). Thus, one might argue that a future tribunal could rule contrary to the court in Abaclat,
undermining the significance of the decision. However, both the practice and purpose of
international investment arbitration suggest that this is unlikely to occur. In ICSID cases, counsel
frequently rely on previous decisions to support their positions, and tribunals regularly cite to
prior cases in their rulings. This promotes one of the chief purposes of international investment
law: "[Tjo establish a predictable, stable framework for investments, which causes tribunals to pay
attention to previous decisions on similar issues." Id at 156. In Abaclat, in particular, the tribunal
interpreted a key phrase present in every BIT. Given the importance of uniformity and
consistency, a future tribunal seems unlikely to come to the exact opposite conclusion-that
sovereign debt is not an investment-without strong justification.
See Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, Improving the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process: Problems in
Restructuring, Proposed Solutions, and a Roadmap for Reform *2 (unpublished paper prepared for the
Improving the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process conference co-hosted by the Institute for
International Economics and Institut Franiais des Relations Internationales 2003), online at
www.iie.com/publications/papers/roubini-setser03O3.pdf (visited Mar 30, 2012).
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proposal. Exchange offers are decided solely by debtor countries and made on a
take-it-or-leave it basis. And there are no rules or methods by which to establish
rules outlining the treatment of different creditor groups. 62 When debtor
countries do breach creditors' few legal rights, which are primarily contractual,
the judgments of national courts are largely unenforced, due to sovereign
immunity and the minimal presence of state assets abroad.63
ICSID involvement could increase creditor protection by providing
greater likelihood of compliance with decisions against debtor states. Evidence
suggests that so far, observance of ICSID awards has been both voluntary and
high.64 While the ICSID Convention does recognize sovereign immunity,65
ICSID awards are more likely to be followed than the awards of national courts
or other international arbitral panels for three key reasons. First, the ICSID is
part of the World Bank Group, meaning that debtor countries may fear that
noncompliance with ICSID awards will result in negative attention from the
World Bank and its partners. During the financial crises that accompany default,
countries are often dependent on substantial, but conditional, aid from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), a key World Bank ally.66 If noncompliance
did become an issue, the World Bank and/or the IMF could threaten debtor
countries with a funding cut-off, or refuse to extend further loans, for failure to
recognize ICSID awards.67 This would truly give ICSID rulings bite.
Second, ICSID awards are final, binding, and not subject to review outside
the Convention.68 They are also required by Article 54 of the Convention to be
recognized and enforced by and in all states that are parties to the Convention as
if they were final judgments of those states' domestic courts.69 Creditors can

62
63

See id at *3.
Waibel, Soveregn Defauls Before InternationalCourts and Tribunals at 318 (cited in note 3).

64

Id.

65

67

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Art 55, 575 UN Treaty Set 159 (1966) (ICSID Convention).
For example, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, and
Uruguay. See Javier Diaz-Cassou, Aitor Erce-Dominguez, and Juan J. Vazquez-Zimora, The Role
of the IVIF in Recent Sovereign Debt Restructurings *10 (Banco de Espaila Occasional Paper No 0805
2008), online at http://ideas.repec.org/p/bde/opaper/0805.html (visited Mar 30, 2012).
In fact, Argentina has indeed been barred from sources of international finance as a result of its

68

refusal to comply with some ICSID awards. See Dany Khayat, Enforcement of Awards in ICSID
Arbitration (Mayer Brown Dec 19, 2011), online at http://www.mayerbrown.com/
publications/article.asp?id=11916&nid=6 (visited Mar 30, 2012). This has been burdensome even
for Argentina, which is much less dependent on these sources now than most countries entering
default. Id.
See ICSID Convention at Art 53 (cited in note 65).

69

Id at Art 54. This resjudicatarequirement is unique among international courts and tribunals.

66
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therefore pursue enforcement in whichever state offers the highest likelihood of
recovery-like the country in which the debtor's assets are located.7o
Third, ICSID awards are both public and high-profile.7' Noncompliance
would send a clear message to international capital markets, hindering a debtor
country's reputation and future ability to raise money abroad. While any default
leads to heightened risk premiums and increased difficulty raising funds, failure
to follow the ruling of a respected, independent body could have crippling longterm consequences for countries hoping to reenter international debt markets.
Further, Article 27 of the ICSID Convention explicitly allows investor countries
to resort to explicit diplomatic protection in the event of noncompliance,
meaning that investor states could even go as far as bringing a suit with the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).72 The price of diplomatic protection has
been considered even higher than the threat of Article 54 judicial enforcement.73
Enforceable ICSID arbitration could also allow the growth of a healthy
market for sovereign debt-one not based solely on reputation but on reliable
contracts. As discussed above, when creditors know that they have legitimate
recourse in the event of sovereign default, they likely will be more willing to
invest, or will charge lower risk premiums, knowing that their investments are
protected. Promises to pay would no longer be merely promises backed solely by
past behavior, but true obligations likely to be enforced. This could lead to
greater access to financing for all states, and more efficient investment by
creditors, increasing the welfare of both borrowing and lending countries.
These benefits aside, however, some scholars have pointed out potential
negative aspects of ICSID involvement in sovereign debt restructuring. Section
III.B responds to each of these objections and Section III.C suggests a way in
which legitimate concerns might be mitigated.

7o See Christoph Schreuer, The World Bank/ICSID Dispute Settlement Procedures (OECD), online at

71

www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/25/2758044.pdf (visited Mar 30, 2012). While some countries will
likely have few assets to pursue, there has been evidence of defaulting countries' hiding assets in
foreign countries-Argentina, for example. See also Edward Schumacher, Defending Argentina's
New Democracy, NY Times Section 6 (June 10, 1984).
Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before InternationalCourts and Tribunalsat 319 (cited in note 3).

72

See Gauthier Vanrueuwenhuyse, Bringing a Dispute Concerning ICSID Cases and the ICSID Convention
Before the InternationalCourt of Justice, 8 Law and Practice of Intl Courts and Tribunals 115, 120-21
(2009).

73

See Giuliana Cane, The Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Revolutionary or Ineffective?, 15 Am Rev Intl Arb
439, 458 (2006). Cane also notes that both diplomatic and judicial methods of enforcement may
be used to gain compliance. Id.
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B. Objections and Responses
1. Decreased involvement of creditor governments and international
institutions.
Some scholars contend that ICSID involvement in sovereign debt
restructuring could minimize the role of creditor governments and other
international institutions, like the IMF, in managing debt crises. This, they
assume, may mean decreased economic policy flexibility.74 However, this
argument suffers from several flaws. First, the need for IMF involvement,
especially in the form of bailouts, is often the result of creditors' fleeing
sovereign financial distress out of fear of inadequate treatment during
restructuring.7 5 If enforcement became more reliable, IMF and creditorgovernment intervention may become less necessary. Similarly, creditor
governments become involved in restructuring negotiations primarily due to the
lack of a single forum in which individual creditors can resolve their claims.76
Basically, creditor governments often seek to solve collective action problems
between investors. Recourse to ICSID arbitration, especially with access to mass
claims, could remove the need for such high-level government involvement.
Second, while creditor governments have traditionally played a role as
"diplomatic gatekeeper over sovereign debt,"77 a shift in control to individual
creditors is not necessarily negative. While creditor governments may have a
larger and more flexible arsenal for negotiations, they often have a less
significant stake in the result of specific disputes than individual investors. If
creditor governments undermine the welfare of these investors in favor of other
interests, they undermine a key purpose of international investment
agreements-the promotion of foreign investment. People will be less likely to
invest in other countries if they do not believe their investments will be
protected and are not allowed to control their own disputes. Moreover, a focus
on creditors as individuals, rather than as countries, may lead to more uniform
treatment. Currently, creditor countries with established diplomatic relationships
with the debtor may have greater bargaining power during restructuring than
countries without existing ties. A shift from state diplomacy to individual
adjudication may keep debtor countries from distinguishing important partners,
potentially undermining their ability to deal with their own financial crises.
However, it would ensure a consistency of creditor treatment that would
encourage greater investment ex ante. Ultimately, these ex ante gains must be
weighed against the loss of ex post diplomatic flexibility. Given that ICSID

74

Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before InternationalCourts and Tribunals at 317 (cited in note 3).

7s

Roubini and Setser, Improving the Sovereign Debt RestructuringProcess at *6 (cited in note 61).

76

See Wells, Property Rghts for Foreign Capitalat477 (cited in note 8).

77

Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before InternationalCourts and Tribunals at 316 (cited in note 3).
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involvement may in fact decrease the need for IMF and creditor intervention,
and that this intervention is not always beneficial, the benefits of individual
creditor-based arbitration may be substantial enough to mitigate any losses.
2. Determining debtor capacity to pay.
Some scholars also maintain that it is critical that any international tribunal
be able to determine a defaulting country's actual capacity to pay, and claim that
the ICSID lacks the expertise to do so. 8 This argument, however, ignores both
the alternative state of affairs and the ICSID's flexibility. Currently, debtor
countries themselves essentially "determine" their own capacity to pay. And,
historically, sovereign debt disputes have largely been resolved by national
courts.79 While exact economic tools may not yet exist to measure a country's
ability to pay, it seems illogical to argue that self-interested parties and courts
with fewer resources should therefore be left to make the determination, rather
than an impartial body able actively to consider the best methods of evaluation.
Moreover, international tribunals in the past have been entrusted with this
authority, and throughout the twentieth century there have been calls for the
establishment of an International Loans Tribunal to serve precisely this
purpose.o There is also evidence that the ICSID is aware of the importance of
taking debtor payment capacity into consideration. The tribunal in Saluka
Investments BT/ v Czech RepubliM recognized that international law should not
require states to compensate foreign investors when "in the normal exercise of
their regulatory powers, they adopt in a nondiscriminatory manner bona fide
regulations that are aimed at general welfare."82 While it may be a difficult and
contentious task, tribunals can exercise judicial restraint in their determinations
by recognizing differences in methods or opinions by hearing and evaluating the
testimony of multiple experts.83 Disagreements need not preclude an ultimate
assessment by the tribunal, but may simply act to restrain decisions with
significant consequences.
Finally, an increase in ICSID claims would arguably allow the development
of legal principles for determining when a nation is unable to pay its debts. A

78

Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before InternationalCourts and Tribunals at 323 (cited in note 3).

79

Id.

80

Id at 324.

81

Saluka Investments BV (Neth) v CZech Republic, Partial Award (UNCITRAL 2006), online at
(visited
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SAL-CZ/20Partial%20Award%/20170306.pdf
Mar 30, 2012).
Id at 255.

82
83

Many courts do so when determining the value of assets not traded in a liquid market. See, for
example, US v Cartwrght, 411 US 546 (1973) (determining the validity of a method of valuing
mutual fund shares).
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coherent framework only will arise if it can be built over time, and the ICSID is
currently likely the best available forum to begin resolving this issue.
3. Intent of the parties.
Scholars also contend that countries that explicitly gave national courts
jurisdiction in their bond contracts did not intend for disputes to end up in front
of an international tribunal.84 Yet countries have arguably been aware of the
possibility that bilateral investment treaties cover sovereign debt for some time.
Scholars began to discuss the possibility upon Argentina's default. And soon
after investors were bringing suits to the ICSID based on this interpretation.85
After these developments, some countries chose explicitly to exclude
sovereign debt from their BITs.86 However, very few BITs, even new ones, have
actually included this restriction.87 The fact that for over ten years most countries
have not taken steps to remove sovereign debt from their agreements suggests
an awareness, and perhaps even an intention, that these disputes may be
resolved before the ICSID. Even if this is not the case, the ruling in Abaclat
ensures that countries are now aware of the possibility of creditor recourse to
the ICSID. If countries do not in fact desire ICSID involvement, they are free to
take action to ensure that sovereign debt is clearly excluded from their BITs.88
4. Institutional competence.
There are also historical objections to the involvement of any international
body in sovereign debt restructuring. Opponents claimed for much of the past
century that any institution would be incapable of adapting to constant change in
economic conditions, and that individual adjudicators would likely lack sufficient
expertise." Yet these arguments have been seriously undermined by the
overwhelming success of the World Trade Organization, which provides a

84
85

86

87

88

89

See, for example, Waibel, 101 Am J Intl L at 735 (cited in note 17).
See, for example, id; Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt
Disputes, 17 Am Rev Intl Arb 335 (2006).
Examples of such explicit exclusion include The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), Peru's BITs, and the Australia-Chile BIT. See Gallagher, New Vulture Culture at 16
(cited in note 3).
Even after NAFTA, the US has not continued this practice: the US-Australia, US-South Korea,
US-Morocco, US-Oman, US-Panama, and US-Singapore agreements do not exclude or treat
differently sovereign debt. See id.
It is worth noting, however, that it may be more difficult to amend existing agreements than to
exclude sovereign debt from new agreements. Amendment requires the agreement of both parties
over a single negotiated issue, whereas in initial bargaining one party may use a particular issue as
leverage to obtain more favorable treatment in another area.
Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before InternationalCourtsand Tribunals at 326 (cited in note 3). See also Free
Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Frv Suit-), Order, 1929 PCIJ (ser A) No 22 (Aug 19,
1929).
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model for international legal involvement in the economic arena.90 While these
concerns should certainly be recognized and taken into account, they are likely
exaggerated and should not preclude a potentially beneficial ICSID presence.
5. Holdout incentives.
While many objections to ICSID arbitration during sovereign debt
restructurings are relatively easy to dismiss, there are two legitimate concerns
that should be seriously considered. First, the possibility of recourse to the
ICSID could increase creditors' incentives to hold out of the restructuring
negotiations, potentially prolonging the process and seriously harming debtors.9i
Before considering the negative aspects of greater holdout litigation, it is
important to note that traditional exchange offers are made purely on the
debtor's terms. Bondholders have limited bargaining power. 92 The ability to
threaten ICSID arbitration would increase creditors' bargaining opportunities.
And the ability to bring mass claims could lead to more collective negotiations,
which may allow the parties to reach a settled agreement more quickly, and even
avoid litigation.93 Increased ICSID involvement, at least theoretically, should
bring greater balance to the negotiating process.
However, the introduction of ICSID recourse into the current negotiating
arena could result in significant holdout problems. Any take-it-or-leave-it
exchange offer could be seen as a violation of BITs' expropriation or fair and
equitable treatment clauses, as could extended negotiations. Essentially, creditors
would have a bargaining chip at every step of the process. But unlike in
traditional bankruptcy or under contractual Collective Action Clauses (CACs),94
most BITs have no mechanism by which a majority of creditors can bind
holdouts to a negotiated restructuring plan.95

90

Indeed, it has been claimed that the WTO "may be the single most effective international
agency," with 95 percent of world trade bound to its dispute settlement mechanisms. William A.
Niskanen, Building on the WFTO's Success, 19 Cato J 459, 459 (2000).

91

See Gallagher, The New Vulture Culture at 10 (cited in note 3); Waibel, 101 Am J Intl L at 713 (cited
in note 17).
Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals at 14 (cited in note 3). Though, as
mentioned previously, in the current diplomatic system larger creditor countries often have some
bargaining clout. Further, this is solely for traditional exchange offers-note that the current
situation in Greece, which will be discussed in greater depth in Section IV, represents a unique
voluntary pre-default exchange.

92

93

Mass claims will necessarily lead to a quicker adjudication process, but if those creditors who
would be grouped together during litigation are able to bargain together during restructuring, they
may be able to negotiate more effectively and stay away from litigation entirely.

94

These allow a supermajority of creditors to bind a minority to certain restructuring terms. For
further discussion, see Section IV.

95

Even if bonds did include contractual collective action solutions, Abaclat ensured that these would
not have to be adhered to if holdouts wished to bring a separate treaty claim.
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Some recent US-negotiated BITs and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have,
however, included provisions prohibiting claims against negotiated debt
restructuring, unless an investor alleges that the restructuring violates the
national treatment or most favored nation clauses.96 "Negotiated restructuring"
generally means a restructuring where 75 percent of bondholders have agreed to
modified payment terms.97 So if a contractual CAC agreement were reached,
treaty claims would be barred. While currently included in very few agreements,
and subject to the problems of CAC resolution,98 these provisions represent a
positive step toward mitigating the holdout problem.
Ultimately, while greater creditor bargaining power may be desirable, the
way that restructuring negotiations normally occur, and the lack of an
established method by which to bind minority holdouts, may allow inflexible
holdouts seriously to impair efficient restructuring.
6. Domestic prioritization.
Second, the focus on equal treatment of creditors in bilateral investment
treaties could render a debtor country unable to favor domestic creditors even
when this is reasonably necessary for continuing crucial national functions.99 As
mentioned previously, during both the Russian and Argentinean sovereign debt
restructurings the government prioritized debt held by domestic investors, often
providing them earlier recovery on better terms. The debtor countries argued
that this was absolutely necessary to keep their financial systems from collapse,
to create liquidity, and to minimize risk.1oo Scholars have pointed out that
domestic preference may also allow domestic employers to maintain salaries,
pensions, benefits, and the like; keep up domestic demand; and stave off
widespread protest.10 ' Treating priority for domestically held debt as a violation

96

These include the US-Uruguay BIT and FTAs with Central America, Chile, Colombia, and Peru.
See Kevin P. Gallagher, Mission Creep: International Investment Agreements and Sovereign Debt
online
at
http://
Treaty
News
Jan
12,
2012),
Restrmcturing, (Investment
www.iisd.org/itn/2012/01/12/mission-creep-international-investment-agreements-andsovereign-debt-restructuring-3/ (visited Mar 30, 2012).

97

Id.
The biggest problem with CAC resolution in sovereign debt crises is that any agreement is limited
to the bondholders of a single issue, while restructuring generally involves numerous bond
issues-this leads to collective action problems. See G10, Report of the G-10 Working Group on
Contractual Clauses (Sept 2002), online at www.bis.org/publ/gtenO8.htm (visited Mar 30, 2012).
Moreover, as is the case in Greece, some bonds may not include CACs at all. Holders of those
bonds would still be free to bring investment claims.

98

99

See Anna Gelpern and Brad Setser, Domestic and External Debt: The Doomed Quest for Equal
Treatment, 35 Georgetown J Intl L 795, 796-98 (2004).

100

See Panizza, Is Domestic Debt the Answer? at 1-2 (cited in note 20); Gorbunov, The Russian Federation
at 2, 9 (cited in note 20).

1o1 See Gelpern and Setser, 35 Georgetown J Intl L at 796 (cited in note 99).
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of BITs' national treatment clauses could therefore be detrimental to debtor
countries attempting to restructure their debt without a severe national crisis.
The Saluka case suggests the ICSID is aware of the importance of
legitimate state actions taken to improve national welfare.102 There, the tribunal
refused to consider state regulations expropriatory.103 If sovereigns can justify the
preference of domestic creditors on national welfare grounds, then the logic of
Saluka may be extended to national treatment claims. Moreover, the provisions
included in the US BITs and FTAs discussed above suggest that countries could
amend agreements to modify or remove national treatment provisions in the
case of sovereign debt restructuring. This may prove a complex task, however,
as (1) broad or ambiguous language could lead to detrimental manipulation by
defaulting countries, suggesting high error and therefore high bargaining costs,
and (2) the implications of failing to take action have not yet been extensively
discussed in scholarship or determined in an explicit ruling by the court, unlike
with sovereign debt as an investment. Thus, the bargaining costs of modification
likely outweigh the uncertain benefits, which may explain why no changes have
been seen in this area. These difficulties, and the uncertainty as to whether
future tribunals would actually extend the ruling in Saluka, render BITs'
interference with legitimate domestic prioritization a well-founded concern.
C. A Potential Solution
Both the holdout and domestic preference concerns could be mitigated by
some change in the sovereign debt restructuring process. If ICSID involvement
were accompanied by a formal sovereign debt restructuring mechanism that
took these issues into account, the result could prove positive for all parties.
Soon after Argentina's default, scholars began proposing alternatives to the
current free-market sovereign debt restructuring process. Suggestions for
SDRMs included the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism104 and its
predecessor, the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Convention."os While the IMF's
specific proposal was rejected, various forms of a sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism have continued to be discussed in scholarly literature.1os

102

Saluka, Partial Award at

1255.

103

Id.

104

IMF, Proposals for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) (2003),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdrm.htm (visited Mar 30, 2012).

105

See Steven L. Schwarcz, "Idiot's Guide" to Soveregn Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory L J 1189, 1195--97

online

at

(2004).
106

See, for example, Andrea Orzan, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: Who Opposes It and Wy?,
NT/02/04 (Centro de Investigaci6n Latinoamerica Europa 2004), online at www.cilae.org/
publicaciones/SDRM.pdf (visited Mar 30, 2012); Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Options: An Analytical Comparison, Harv Bus L Rev (forthcoming 2011), online at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty-scholarship/2404/ (visited Mar 30, 2012).
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While the details of these plans differ, the basic SDRM structure is the
same. Debtors and creditors are bound by an international convention that lays
out a specific debt restructuring procedure. This includes a CAC-like provision
that binds holdouts to restructuring plans approved by a supermajority of
creditors.'o7 If these holdouts were nonetheless to bring claims to the ICSID,
tribunals would be unlikely to authorize an award in direct contravention of
another international treaty.10 However, before a majority of creditors reached
any agreement, the potential for ICSID recourse would still provide the benefits
of more equal bargaining, as well as increased creditor security and therefore
increased lending pre-default. Therefore, the presence of an SDRM would allow
the benefits of ICSID involvement while blocking key holdout concerns.
Many SDRM schemes have also proposed adding priority structures to the
restructuring process. 0 9 This may be key to the resolution of the national
treatment problem. Proposals have focused on giving priority to creditors who
continue to finance insolvent countries during the restructuring process.110 A
debtor country's favorable treatment of domestic creditors arguably serves a
similar purpose-it allows the country to continue critical internal operations
during the crisis.111 And as the SDRM form of prioritization is targeted at groups
of creditors who clearly continue to aid the country, it avoids the complications
of a court's trying to determine which domestic preferences were truly critical. If
priority structures allow countries to avoid national treatment discrimination
while ensuring that crucial domestic functions continue, the fear that ICSID
involvement would hinder domestic prioritzation should be greatly mitigated.
An SDRM could alleviate concerns over increased ICSID involvement in
sovereign debt restructurings. Any mechanism that allows a majority of creditors
to bind holdouts and establishes a priority scheme encouraging adequate debtorcountry financing during restructuring would allow all parties to benefit from
ICSID involvement without suffering from many of its potential inefficiencies.

107

See Scbwarze Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options at *18 (cited in note 106).

108

While there is nothing explicitly in the ICSID Convention requiring adherence to other
3
international treaties, Article 31( )(c) of the Vienna Convention requires that treaty interpretation
rules
of international law applicable to the parties. See Salacuse, The
account
relevant
take into
Law of Investment Treaties at 150 (cited in note 33).

109

See Schwarc, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options at *19 (cited in note 106).

110

See, for example, Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the InternationalLender of Last
Resort, 6 Chi J Intl L 177, 186-87 (2005). This mechanism would serve much the same function as
the purchase money priority interest in US secured transactions law.

Mii See id.
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IV. THE EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIS
A. General Background
In December 2009, Greece's debts had reached (300 billion-the highest
level in its modern history.112 This debt was equal to 113 percent of Greece's
GDP, far above the EU's 60-percent limit.113 Over the following months, ratings

agencies began to downgrade Greek government debt and the Euro began to fall
continually against the dollar. In May 2010, the IMF and other eurozone
countries offered Greece a (110 billion bailout. Fears of similar debt woes
spread to Ireland and Portugal. In November, the EU and IMF extended (85
billion in assistance to Ireland and, in May, (78 billion to Portugal.114
The situation in Greece failed to improve and a second bailout of (109
billion was arranged in July 2011. But yields on Italian and Spanish government
bonds continued to rise sharply, forcing the European Central Bank (ECB) to
buy sovereign debt. Eurozone banks began to struggle visibly, leading to ECB
emergency loans. October 2011 brought another (8 billion in loans to Greece.115
In March 2012, Greece technically defaulted.116 In order to secure another
round of IMF Funding, it reached a voluntary deal with private creditors.", The
details of this deal are key to evaluating the potential for international investment
arbitration in Greek restructuring.
B. Greek Restructuring
First, it is important to understand the content, governing law, and
ownership of Greek sovereign bonds. Ninety percent of Greek bonds, more
than $200 billion,"s are governed by Greek law.119 These bonds contain no

112
113

Timeline: The Unfolding Euroone Crisis (BBC Feb 13, 2011), online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/business -13856580 (visited Mar 30, 2012).
Id. This limit was established by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the adoption of
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). See Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and
Growth Pact, OJ 1997 (C 236) 1; Council Regulation No 1467/97, 1997 OJ (L 209) 6. For a
general history and overview of the requirement, see European Commission, Stability and Growth
Pact (Oct 17, 2011) online at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic-governance
/sgp/deficit/index en.htm (visited Apr 18, 2012).

114

Timeine: The Unfolding Euro.one Crisis (cited in note 112).
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116

Abigail Moses and Mary Childs, Greek Credit Swaps PaYouts to Be Expedited after Trigger Ruling
(Bloomberg Mar 9, 2012), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-09/greek-debtdeal-might-trigger-3-billion-of-default-swaps-under-isda-rules.htmI (visited Mar 30, 2012).
Matina Stevis, Private Creditors Back Greek Debt Swap (Wall St J Mar 6, 2012), online at
4
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203458604577263450537670 04.htrnl (visited
Mar 30, 2012).
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provisions,120 no pan

passu

clauses,121
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and

no cross-default

clauses.122 This means that in the event of restructuring, bondholders have very
few contractual opportunities to hold out in bargaining with Greece.123 Only 10
percent, approximately $25 billion, of Greek bonds are governed by foreignpredominately English-law.124 These bonds include CACs, which permit
holders of either 66 percent or 75 percent of a bond issue, depending on the
year of issue, to agree to modified payment terms and bind all other
bondholders to these terms.125 The bonds also contain pari passu clauses, crossdefault clauses, and negative pledges. As a result, holders of Greek bonds
governed by English law have considerably greater contractual opportunities to
hold out during restructuring negotiations and thereby obtain better terms.126
While it is difficult to know the exact distribution of Greek bonds, it
appears that the holders are largely public institutions.127 European governments,
the IMF, the ECB, and eurozone national central banks are believed to hold
more than 50 percent of Greek sovereign bonds, while Greek institutional
investors hold around 30 percent. That leaves the private investors in Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK.12
The deal reached with these private creditors in March consisted of two
phases. First, holders of Greek law-governed bonds tendered around $199.5
billion in existing debtl29 in exchange for new bonds with a face value of 31.5
percent of the original bonds, notes from the European Financial Stability Fund,

119

See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts: A
Greek Case Study With Implicationsfor the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism *2 (Chicago Working
Paper Series 2011), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1713914 (visited Mar 31, 2012).

An example of a modification provision would be Collective Action Clauses (CACs), further
discussed below, which allow a supermajority of bondholders of a particular issue to agree to a
modification of payment by the debtor.
121 These contain the borrower's promise that the bond will rank equally, in terms of right to
payment, with all of its other unsubordinated debts.
122 Choi, Gulati, and Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts at *14 (cited in note 119).
120

123

Id at *4.

124

See id at *2.

125 See G10, Report of the G-10 Working Group on ContractualClauses at *3 (cited in note 98).
126

Though evidence has shown that these bondholders actually paid a premium in exchange for this
holdout opportunity. See Choi, Gulati, and Posner, Priing Terms in Soverezgn Debt Contracts at *17
(cited in note 119).

127

Greek Debt: Everyone's Problem (The Economist June 22, 2011), online at http://wwv
.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/06/greek-debt (visited Mar 31, 2012).

128 Id.
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Moses and Childs, Greek Credit Swaps Payouts to Be Expedited (cited in note 116).
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and securities linked to Greek output. 30 Greece then extended the offer to
holders of foreign-law governed bonds, swapping at least $2.5 billion.131
The fact that 90 percent of Greece's sovereign debt is governed by Greek
law put Greece in the unique position to change its law to effectuate wide-scale
restructuring. Greece successfully did so, adding the equivalent of CACs to
Greek law to bind holdouts and thereby garnering 95.7 percent participation.132
C. Abaclat and Greece
However, Abaclat may have changed the playing field. If sovereign debt
falls under Greece's BIT obligations,13 and Greece's decision to change its law is
considered an exercise of sovereign power, any contractual CAC will not bar
treaty claims. Bondholders may therefore be able to hold out from contractual
restructuring by threatening to bring claims with the ICSID. They will bring
claims if they believe they can obtain better returns with this strategy: They may
believe, for example, that their debt is so junior that during restructuring they
would receive almost nothing, making the chance to obtain an enforceable
damages award actually worth more. This is precisely the holdout risk discussed
previously: these creditors could prevent timely, efficient restructuring. Indeed,
scholars who have recently commented on the implications of Abaclat have all
raised fears of ICSID claims during Greek restructuring.134

130

Greece Extends Foreign-Law Bond Swap Deadline (APF Mar 23, 2012), online
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j6TGwmpaeyhjyJPdnYZzkBQ9Cg?docId=CNG.bf5d089cf24ee0e2049a013355d10a48.a31 (visited Mar 31, 2012).
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To avoid what they see as detrimental ICSID involvement, scholars have
proposed several ways in which sovereign debt restructuring might be removed
from the ICSID's reach. The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) and Professor Kevin P. Gallagher have suggested
that international investment agreements be amended to exempt sovereign debt
from their purview.135 They have further recommended that the resolution of
these issues should take place through state-state arbitration or solely in national
courts.136 Finally, they have lauded the inclusion of "essential security
exceptions" in BITs, which allow states to take actions they consider necessary
to maintain essential security interests and could be interpreted to provide
immunity for states in economic and financial crises.137 Yet these policy solutions
are entirely inapplicable to the current situation in Greece. Greece is party to 41
BITs, 39 of which are in force. All of Greece's BITs include expropriation,
national treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and transfers clauses, and all but
fourl38 expressly include consent to ICSID arbitration. None of Greece's BITs
exclude sovereign debt; none provide exclusive jurisdiction to national courts; 39
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UNCTAD, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and InternationalInvestment Agreements at *8 (cited in note 12);
Gallagher,Mission Creep (cited in note 96).
UNCTAD, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and InternationalInvestment Agreements at *8 (cited in note 12);
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UNCTAD, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and InternationalInvestment Agreements at *8 (cited in note 12);
Gallagher, New Vulture Culture at 20 (cited in note 3).
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Government of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of the Hellenic Republic for the
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779.aspx?Pagelndex=0&TextWord=/ 27G
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(visited Apr 18, 2012);
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only one limits resolution to state-state arbitration;140 and only one includes an
essential security exception.141 While these proposed solutions may prove viable
in the future,142 they are irrelevant to the situation currently at hand.
In spite of this, holdouts pursuing ICSID arbitration may not actually be a
critical concern for Greece. The majority of Greece's bondholders are investors
in Western European countries-Belgium, France, Germany, the UK, and
perhaps the US143-yet Greece does not have any BITs with these countries.144
And while Greece is part of the economically integrated EU, as well as the
European Economic Area, which both require the free movement of goods,
persons, services, and capital among EU and certain other European countries,
these agreements do not provide for specific investment protections comparable
to those in BITs.145 Therefore, if investors in these countries continue to be the
primary holders of Greek debt, their restructuring holdout options are likely to
be solely contractual (or based on violations of other international law).
Even if investors in countries with BITs with Greece were to purchase
Greek debt, perhaps believing that pursuing litigation (especially in mass claims
form, where individual costs are likely low) would be profitable, the analysis in
Section III suggests that this may not be as detrimental as commentators are
suggesting. ICSID recourse would allow some creditors greater leverage to
Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of
the Hellenic Republic for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1992),
online at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/chinagreece.pdf (visited Mar 31,
2012).
140 See Vertrag Zwischen der Bundesruplic Deutschlandund dem Konigreich Greichenland uber die Forderung und
den Gegenseitigen ScbutZ von Kapitalanlagen, (1961), online at http://www.unctad.org/sections
/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany-greecegr.pdf (visited Mar 31, 2012).
141 Agreement Between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the
Republic of India on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (2007), online at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/greece-india.pdf (visited Mar 31, 2012).
Moreover, it is still unclear to what extent the essential security exception actually covers
economic and financial crises, and to what standard of necessity countries will be held. See
Salacuse,Investment Treaties at 345 (cited in note 33).
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(cited in note 117).
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negotiate with Greece, which may simply lead to settlement, rather than
litigation.146 But the more significant benefits of ICSID recourse are likely to be
seen by other European countries in financial distress. The next section
discusses how this development may lessen the severity of the current crisis.
D. The Future of the European Debt Crisis
It seems unlikely that the same investors that currently hold Greek debt
will similarly dominate the market for the debt of other struggling European
countries. Take Italy, for example. As Greece restructures, banks exposed to
Italian debt may fear contagion and begin to unload their Italian bonds. In a
worst-case scenario, already over-stretched official-sector institutions may
eventually be unable or unwilling to take the kind of actions they have with
Greece in order to stave off an Italian collapse. But investors with ties to
countries that do have BITs with Italyl47 should be aware of the increased
possibility of recourse to ICSID arbitration after Abaclat. And if they believe that
they can get higher returns by threatening or pursuing arbitration in the event of
a restructuring, they may be incentivized to buy up some of this debt.
While any acquisition of Italian bonds by investors in countries with BITs
with Italy could garner the same concerns of inefficient restructuring, there is a
more positive perspective available. If creditors believe that they will have a
strong negotiating position in the event of a default, they will not flee so quickly
as countries begin to struggle financially. If markets for sovereign debt continue
to function well, this means that struggling countries will be able to issue new
bonds more cheaply-which would actually help stave off, or at least reduce the
size of, any default. Increased creditor ability to hold out ex post may decrease
the chance of debtor default ex ante. Thus, the mere possibility of ICSID
recourse could lessen the severity of the European Debt Crisis.
V. CONCLUSION
The ICSID's recent ruling in Abaclat has ensured that international
investment arbitration will play a role in future sovereign debt restructurings.
Despite concerns over the effect of this development on the efficiency of
restructuring, increased ICSID involvement may in fact prove positive. Recourse
to the ICSID should improve creditor protections, stabilize the market for
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Steven Friel, a litigation partner at Brown Rudnick, recently expressed a similar opinion: "The
primary strategy is unlikely to be a court judgment after protracted litigation. Bondholders are
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sovereign debt, and allow for more balanced and collective bargaining during
restructuring. Moreover, the establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism that deals with both holdout and debtor financing issues could
mitigate the most serious concerns over ICSID arbitration and benefit both
creditors and debtors. While the ICSID may not be the ideal forum to begin
developing this strand of international law, it has nonetheless chosen to take on
this task and may indeed effect positive change. In the context of the current
European debt crisis, evidence suggests that while international investment
arbitration may not play a major role in Greek restructuring, the potential for
ICSID recourse may strengthen the sovereign debt market, lessen the chance of
default in other struggling European countries, and ultimately diminish the
severity of the crisis.
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